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If the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Ad-
ministration of Justice made one point clear, it is that the system
for dealing with juvenile offenders is neither treating effectively
the patterns which bring young people into the system, nor pre-
venting the recurrence of those patterns. The enormity of the
problem, just in numbers, can be seen by the fact that projections
for 1975 indicate an increase of 70% in the incarceration of juvenile
offenders with 83% of the nation's institutions already operating
at, or in excess of, their capacity.' One way to reduce the number
of juveniles flowing through the criminal justice system is to re-
strict the input by removal of those statutes that define behavior not
unlawful if committed by an adult as juvenile crime.
* Deputy Probation Officer I, San Diego County Probation Depart-
ment. Working towards Master's degree in Criminal Justice at San Diego
State College.
NOTE: The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent the views of the San Diego County Probation
Department.
1. PREsIDENT's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEviENT AND THE ADn nsTRA-
TiON OF JUSTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: CoRREcTIoNs at 45 (1967) [herein-
after cited as CoanEcTroNs].
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A proposal to this effect was introduced on February 8, 1971, in
the regular session of the California legislature by Assemblymen
Murphy, Biddle, Miller, Vasconcellos and Crown.2 The bill, AB
412, amended several sections of the Penal Code, Vehicle Code, and
a sweeping number of Welfare and Institutions Code provisions
relating to minors. The most important provision was the repeal
of Section 601 and the amendment of Section 600 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code (W&I) to include the truancy provision
contained in the former section. However, as the result of tre-
mendous pressure from probation, court, and police agencies, the
bill was quickly amended to keep Section 601 in the W&I Code
although its wording was substantially changed. The truancy
provision remained as originally proposed.
This paper will discuss only that portion of AB 412 which, prior
to its amendment, would have repealed Section 601 and thereby
restrict the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Since Section 601 is typi-
cal of delinquent tendencies and incorrigibility statutes in many
other states,4 the foregoing comments are pertinent and applicable
to these laws as well.
Section 601 W&I presently reads:
Any person under the age of 21 years who persistently or habitu-
ally refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions
of his parents, guardian, custodian or school authorities, or who is
beyond the control of such person, or any person who is a habitual
truant from school within the meaning of the law of this State, or
who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd,
or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court. 5
The current system of criminal justice has three major interde-
pendent components-police, courts, and corrections-each with its
2. A.B. 412, Cal. Legis., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 8, 1971). (Assemblymen Mur-
phy, Biddle, Miller, Vasconcelos and Crown) [hereinafter cited as AB 412].
3. A.B. 412, Cal. Legis., Reg. Sess. (February 8, 1971), amended,
April 15, 1971 (Assemblymen Murphy, Biddle, Miller, Vasconcelos and
Brown) [hereinafter cited as AB 412 (amended)]. (The bill has been
defeated in the Senate.) The amended version of § 601 read, "Any per-
son under the age of 18 years who is beyond the control of his parent,
guardian or custodian, because of his persistent and habitual refusal to
obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of such person, is
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court ......
4. Comment, Delinquent Child: A Legal Term Without Meaning, 21
BAYLOR L. REv. 352 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
5. CAL. WELFAR & INST'N CODE § 601 (West 1966).
own tasks and functions. Although they are independent, they each
have grave consequences for one another. In most instances, the
policeman initiates the process of criminal justice through his ap-
prehension and arrest of an individual due to a violation or sus-
pected violation of criminal law. In the cases of a juvenile, not
only is the above true, but he is also subject to apprehension and
arrest because he is defined as being a person described in Section
601.
The behavior described in this section is at its best imprecise
and ambiguous.6 To sort out only certain juveniles when the pro-
scribed behavior is commonplace among all at one time or another,
is to vitiate this section.7 In this respect, there is accumulating
evidence that who is and who isn't a delinquent is a matter of def-
inition and degree, not withstanding, that the official delinquent
has incurred the sanctions of the juvenile court.6 Studies indicate
the incidence of delinquency among the adolescent population to be
much greater than anticipated and that official statistics reveal only
a fraction of the delinquency committed in any community.9 An
inference to be drawn from the foregoing is that the police and
6. Comment, supra note 4; Gonzales v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal.,
Feb. 9, 1971). A three-judge U.S. District Court found that part of a § 601
which extends jurisdiction over minors for being "in danger of leading an
idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life" to be unconstitutional. On February
19, 1971, the California Attorney General's office obtained an order to
stay the decision pending disposition of an appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Their application to determine whether or not the U.S. Supreme
Court will exercise jurisdiction has been docketed for the October 1971
term.
7. PREsinENT's CoIm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF Jus-
TicE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociETY at 170 (1967) [herein-
after cited as PREsmENT's COmm'N]. It has been estimated that 90% of
the young people, before they reach the age of 18, have committed a
delinquent act that could have resulted in juvenile court action, Since
few are caught, it is assumed that most turn out to be good citizens; See,
Glaser, Criminology and Public Policy, 6 THE Avr. SocioLoGIST 30 (1971).
See also, A. STiNcHcomBE, REBELLIoN IN A HIGH SCHOOL (1964) [hereinafter
cited as STINCHCOMBE].
8. Possibly, delinquent behavior does not become a serious social prob-
lem unless and until society takes some action regarding it. H. BECKER,
OuTsiDERs, 9 (1963), and R. CLOWARD & L. OminN, DELINQENCY & OPPOR-
TUNITY 4-7 (1960).
9. See Empey & Erickson, Hidden Delinquency & Social Status, 44
SociAL FoRcrs 546 (1966); Nye, Short & Olson, Socioeconomic Status and
Delinquent Behavior, 63 Am . J. or Soc. 381 (1958); Murphy, Shirley and
Witmer, The Incidence of Hidden Delinquency, 16 Am. J. oF ORTnopsy-
CHIATRY 686 (1946); A. PORTERFIELD, YOUTH IN TROUBLE (1946); Short and
Nye, Extent of Unrecorded Juvenile Delinquency: Tentative Conclusions,
49 J. Cinvm. L.C. & P.S. 296 (1958); SNcomBE, supra note 7; Vaz, Middle
Class Adolescents: Self Reported Delinquency and Youth Culture Activi-
ties, 2 CANADIAN REV. OF Soc. & AHTHROPOLOGY 52 (1965).
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juvenile court processing, rather than the behavior itself, helps to
fix and perpetuate the delinquency.
Tannenbaum, thirty-three years ago in his book Crime and the
Community, advanced a similar version of this position in what he
called the "dramatization of evil."'-0 In other words, the unintended
consequence of a juvenile's first contact with police, instead of being
simply an unpleasant experience which points up the advantages
of a law-abiding life, may initiate a process that brings the juvenile
back to official attention.1 This is said in another way in the
California's Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure's
Report. "Perhaps the most serious result of trying to cope with
non-criminal behavioral problems through the courts, probation
departments, and penal or quasi-penal institutions is that we might
well be producing in children exactly those qualities that we are
so desperately trying to avoid."12 This statement is supported in
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society13 and in The Throwaway
Children. "[Y] oungsters are trapped in a spiral of delinquency that
leads to further branding by society and its courts. Their young
lives spin in the vortex of a self-fulfilling prophecy: We are what
you say we are-the throwaway children."'14
The obvious implication here is that the vagueness and subjective
quality of this section leaves the definition of delinquent behavior
so broad that official action oftentimes has the opposite effect than
was intended. Part of the definitional difficulty is because
Juvenile Delinquency is not a simple term. It means different
things to different individuals, and it means different things to
different groups. It has meant different things in the same group
at different times.... In popular usage, the term juvenile delin-
quency is used to describe a large number of disapproved behav-
iors of children and youth. In this sense, almost anything that
the youth does that others do not like is called juvenile delin-
quency.15
10. F. TANNENBAUM, CRnM AD THE CoI¢nvmriq- 19-22 (1938).
11. J. CAREY, J. GOLDFARB AND M. ROWE, 2 THE HANDLING OF JUVENILEs
FROi OFFENSE TO DISPosITION 198 (1967).
12. San Diego County Probation Dept., Extracts From the Report of the
Assembly Interim Comm. on Crim. Procedure, report on A:B. 412, Feb. 8,
1971 at 3. [hereinafter referred to and cited as the COMmITrEE].
13. PaREsmET's COmm'N, supra note 7, at 218.
14. L. RIcHETTE, Tnm THROWAWAY CHILDREN 51 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as RicHErE]; see R.F. Merton, The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, in SOCIAL
THEORY AND SocIAL STRUCTURE 421-36 (1957).
15. Reprinted in House APPROPRIATIONS COMMTTEE, REPORT ON JUVENILE
DELiNQUENCY, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1960).
These varied interpretations and definitions can be expected in our
diverse society, but they can have unfortunate consequences when
this conflict is built into our juvenile law and sets up a chain re-
action that becomes the basis for depriving minors of their freedom.
What we are really talking about, then, is the use of discretion
and its impact on the lives of the juveniles to whom it is applied.
As Section 601 now stands, it allows almost anyone in a position of
authority over a minor to become the moral arbitrator of behavior
considered to be non-criminal in nature with the support of criminal
sanctions and the threat of institutionalization. The stigmatizing
effect in the application of this section is the prodromal element for
setting the tone of future encounters. This has grave implications
for the minor as well as for all components of the criminal justice
system, for his entry makes him a statistic.
The police officer has the greatest discretion. By selectively
identifying, according to his own definition of delinquency, those
juveniles who will receive official attention,' 6 he initiates the crim-
inal justice process. In numbers alone the police officer's discre-
tion in arrest and custody decisions can have a vital effect on the
operation of the overall system because he mans the input to the
system.' 7 In a Chicago study' 8 conducted in connection with a
legal service program for youthful offenders, it was found that out
of a possible five hundred arrest situations, the police had arrested
one hundred persons. Of these one hundred, forty were referred to
probation or court intake services with only twenty reaching the
court for adjudication.
There are many variables which affect this decision making proc-
ess, but it should suffice to say that the criteria is neither consistent
nor oftentimes objective in its application.' 9 This sets up and ini-
tiates problems when police officers define the subjective nature
of delinquency and invoke Section 601 on behalf of the minor. In
other words, the presumption of potential criminal acts is used
where, in fact, no violation of law can be found.20  The effect of
16. N. Goldman, The Differential Selection of Juvenile Offenders for
Court Appearance, in Cm=nE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, 264 (W. Chambliss ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as Goldman]; BECOMING DELINQUENT: YOUNG
OFFENDERS Am T=n COmECTIrOAL SYSTmVt 3-4 (P. Garabedian and D. Gib-
bons ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as BECOMING DELINQUENT].
17. See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process
-Low Visibility in the Admin. of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
18. N. Momaus An G. HAWINs, THE HONEST PorrTic's GUIDE TO
CRIVE CONTROL 90-91 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MoRsIS & HAwiwNs].
19. See Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement,
1971 Duun L.J. 717; W. CHAmBiss, CRIME AND THE LEGAL PaocEss 84-98
(1969).
20. PR.snmDE's CoM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT A1D ADMIN. OF Jus-
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this needs examination 21 because the juvenile's reaction to police
field practices generally exacerbates the problem 2 which, in turn,
has many implications through the juvenile system. Thus, the
juvenile's attitude or demeanor may determine whether or not he
is processed through the justice system.23 As Piliavin and Brian
point out, "He is a delinquent because someone in authority has
defined him as one, often on the basis of the public face he has
presented to officials rather than the kind of offense he has com-
mitted."24 And so, the "dramatization of evil" perpetuates the
cycle and feeds the disorder that the system is designed to cure.
The enormity of this problem can be seen from the estimate that
over half of the police arrests for juveniles in the nation are for
crimes that would not be criminal if committed by an adult.25
These are considered "delinquent tendencies" and/or "601" offenses
in California and made up 63% of all juvenile arrests in 1966.26
In San Diego County, this category accounted for 60.5% of all
juvenile arrests by law enforcement agencies for 1969. In 1960,
this category was 62.5% and has remained consistently over the
50% level during the 1960's.27 No analysis as to the disposition of
these arrests has been made, but a study of those booked and de-
tained at the San Diego County Juvenile Hall for the month of
October 1970 reflects this problem.28 This study showed that out
of 971 minors admitted to juvenile hall for that month, approxi-
TIcs, TAsK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AN" YOUTH CRIME at
360 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Juv. DnrI.].
21. Glen, Juv. Court Reform: Procedural Progress and Substantive
Stasis, 1970 WIs. L. REV., 432, 444 [hereinafter cited as Glen].
22. PRESIDENT'S Co1vne'N ON LAW ENFoRcEMENT AND ADmIx. or Jus-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE at 178-189 (1967). The section on
field interrogations, 183-86, is especially interesting as it relates to juve-
niles.
23. Goldman, supra note 16, at 288; Juv. DELI., supra note 20, at 167.
24. Piliavin and Brian, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 THE Am. J.
Soc. 206 (1964).
25. Opinion expressed on NBC Television, White Paper, This Child Is
Rated X, May 2, 1971.
26. MoRsE Am HAwnixs, supra note 18, at 160.
27. F. Closson, Analysis of the Criminal Justice Digest: A Statistical
Summary of the Criminal Justice System in San Diego County 1960-1969
at 3 (1971) (unpublished paper in San Diego State College Public Admin.
Library).
28. R. Ariessohn and F. Closson, Alternatives to Juvenile Detention 8-9
(1971) (unpublished paper in San Diego State College Public Admin.
Library) [hereinafter cited as Ariessohn].
mately half were placed there for "601" offenses. 20 In addition, it
was found that one-half of the 210 minors detained in juvenile hall
by the court were originally booked for "601" offenses. If one were
to judge strictly from the comparative referral and detention rates
between "601" and "602" (i.e., a juvenile whose conduct would be
criminal if committed by an adult) minors, the distinction between
the two would be obscure. In fact, being a runaway or incorrigible
will get a minor referred and detained more often than committing
a burglary, assault or being caught in the possession of drugs.8 0
When the police and the courts fail to make a distinction among the
seriousness of offenses, it is likely that juveniles will view them-
selves as delinquents and respond to this self perception, regardless
of the type of offense committed.
As it relates to the "601" minor, the selection of juveniles facing
the discretionary decisions of probation officers and judges is a
relatively biased sample that has already been determined through
the police officer's concept of juvenile delinquency.31 Even here
there is disparity as to how these cases should be handled. The
same variables which pre-dispose the police officer's determination
such as individual interpretations, personal attitudes, and various
community and organizational pressures, operate at this stage as
well.32 Yona Cohn, in her study of the Bronx (N.Y.) Children
Court, revealed that the kind of delinquent act, when classified ac-
29. That this trend continues is supported by the comment of the proba-
tion department's research analyst, George Watson, that 50% of the San
Diego County Juvenile Hall's floating population is composed of children
committing 601 offenses. San Diego Union, May 16, 1971, sec. B at 4, col. 2.
30. Ariessohn, supra note 28, at 12-13; Sumner, Locking Them Up, 17
CRIME & DELIN. 173-75 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sumner]. This study
also found a 50% detention rate for both prior offense (602 offenses) and
prior delinquency adjudication (601 offenses) categories. In a high de-
tention rate county, one that detained over one-third of the children re-
ferred, children classified as runaways and incorrigibles, also had a higher
rate of detention over other types of offenses. Although not surprising,
there was a relationship with prior record, prior offense, prior delinquency
adjudication, and probation status. However, the difference in detention
rate between the high-rate and low-rate detention counties was apparent.
A crucial finding in the differences among decision-makers raises the
question of whether or not decision-makers are making appropriate judg-
ments; Downey, Why Children Are in Jail, 17 CHILDR 22 (1970). The
Children's Bureau obtained data on the specific offenses of 9,177 children
covering 264 counties in 18 states. Less than 4% of the children in jail
were detained for "offenses against persons", such as assault or robbery.
On the other hand, slightly over 41% consisted of acts that would not have
been violations of law if committed by adults-curfew, running away,
truancy, ungovernability, and possession or drinking of alcoholic beverages.
31. Goldman, supra note 16, at 289.
32. Sheridan, Why Treat in a Correctional System, 31 FED. PROB. 30
(March 1967) [hereinafter cited as Sheridan].
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cording to whether it was committed against life or property,
against sexual taboos, or against parents, was a significant factor in
the probation officer's recommendation to the court.33 It was found
that one-eighth of all children committing delinquencies against
life or property were recommended for institutionalization, but that
one-half of these committing delinquent acts against parents were
so recommended. Another interesting result was that those chil-
dren committing delinquent acts against life or property stood about
an eight to one better chance of getting probation or being dis-
charged from the court's jurisdiction than those committing acts
against parents.
The further along the "601" offender is in the court processes, the
less likely he will be able to extricate himself.3 4 The view that a
mature and educated judge, knowledgeable in law and human be-
havior, will administer justice, is illusory; it is here that the system
is often at its worst instead of its best.35 A study done for the Pres-
ident's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminstration of
Justice revealed that half of the juvenile court judges in the United
States were not college graduates; a fifth had never attended any
college, and a fifth were not members of the bar.36 Over three-
fourths of them spent less than a quarter of their time on juvenile
matters. Hearings were little more than attenuated interviews of
10 to 15 minutes' duration 37 with many being what Lemert calls
"the 3-minute children's hour."38 That some of these judges oper-
ated a form of arbitrary folk law that approached a type of kangaroo
court is more fact than fancy.39 From this kind of background is
33. Cohn, Criteria for the Probation Officer's Recommendation to the
Juvenile Court Judge, 9 Ca-irE & DELm. 262 (1963).
34. Lerman, Child Convicts, 8 TRANs-AcTIoN 38 (July/Aug. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as Lerman]. At the critical decision point, commitment to
an institution is greater for the least serious offenders with juvenile status
offenses/delinquent tendencies. Another study in New York City found
that these same offenders spent more time in custodial facilities at all
stages of their correctional experience than do other delinquents.
35. Justice on Trial, NEWSWEEK, March 8, 1971, at 18, 44-46; See Mur-
phy, His Honor Has Problems Too, 3 CENTER 48 (1971).
36. PREsmmr's Co m'N, supra note 7, at 217 (80).
37. CAL. Gov's SPECIAL STUDY CoinM'N ON Juv. JUSTICE, A STUDY OF
AimIN. oF Juv. JUSTICE IN CAL., pt. 2, at 16 (1960). The report questioned
whether the philosophy of the juvenile court could be carried out in this
time.
38. Juv. DEINi., supra note 20, at 94.
39. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1966); one aspect of this point is ex-
added another layer of interpretation of who is a delinquent and is
to be subject to the correctional system.
We have seen at this point that section 601 is highly arbitrary and
discriminatory and has serious implications in the matter of person-
al growth and freedom for those it was designed to help. It may
be pertinent, then, to ask about the purpose of the juvenile court
law as it pertains to this section. Section 502 W&I Code states
this purpose below:
502. Purpose of chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to secure
for each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such
care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the
spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and
the best interests of the State; to preserve and strengthen the mi-
nor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody
of his parents only when his welfare or safety and protection of
the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and,
when the minor is removed from his own family, to secure for
his custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent
to that which should have been given by his parents. This
chapter shall be liberally construed to carry out these purposes. 40
It is obvious that the chapter has been "liberally construed" only
in the archaic tradition of the juvenile court which acts as the be-
nevolent parent in helping the young people toward a better and
self-fulfilling life. Assumptions made have been that since the
court was good and just, how a juvenile got to court or the fact he
was there at all, was of little consequence because the informal
and welfare orientation of the court was there to serve the child
making due process and legal safeguards unnecessary.4' Although
due process is becoming a part of the juvenile court proceedings,
its implementation is slow and oftentimes circumvented even
though decisions have been rendered in favor of it by case law.
The minor's dilemma led former Justice Abe Fortas to comment in
Kent v. United States42 that the child received the worst of both
possible worlds, getting neither the legal protections provided adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children. It seems a paradox that a nation so obsessed with the
protection of children should treat so casually the official machin-
ery and rules it has set up to effect this protection.
panded in Ferguson, Some Kangaroo Aspects of our Juvenile Courts, 45
CAir. S.B.J. 85 (1970).
40. CAL. WELFARE & ISTw'N CODE § 502 (West 1966).
41. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53-54, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905);
In In re Gault, Justice Fortas stated, "Juvenile court history has again
demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated,
is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." 387 U.S. at
18 (1966).
42. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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The fact is that section 601 was written to encompass non-delin-
quents because the humanitarian philosophy of the juvenile court
made it the sine qua non for all minors in need of help.438 Under
these conditions it was not unusual for the juvenile court to impose
on this kind of child the presumed benefits of its administrations.4
However, it is these youths, who are legally processed alike, con-
signed to identical facilities, and provided the same treatment as
others who commit criminal acts, who really do receive the "worst
of both worlds" in our attempt to treat the need and not the deed.
To lose sight of this matter is to confuse rhetoric with reality. Al-
though this myth of the benevolent nature of the juvenile court
may offer the comforts of traditions, it distorts the problem so it
cannot be faced and dealt with realistically. Thus, the response
to juvenile delinquency, and especially the "601" minor, appears to
be based more upon an elaborate system of "mistaken assumptions,
unwarranted conclusions, and profitable hypocrisy"4 5 than a real
understanding of the problem.
After seventy years, the juvenile court is still far from becoming
what the reformers had envisioned, and it has not significantly re-
habilitated youths, had an impact on juvenile misconduct, or
brought justice and compassion to the young offender 4 6 It has not
come close to meeting the real purpose of the law and it seems un-
likely that elimination of section 601 will cause any less harm than
continuing its existence on the false assumption that it benefits the
child. The committee's report stated
there is no significant evidence that section 601 has been effective
in turning runaways, truants, promiscuous girls or other incor-
rigibles into the kind of children whose behavior patterns satisfy
adult expectations. There is even less evidence that section 601
has produced happier, healthier children who go on to become
better adults because of their court, probationary, or institutional
experiences. 47
Fortunately, most young people, including the greater percentage
of those committing delinquent acts, are able to pass into adulthood
without serious damage to themselves or others. And until such
43. Juv. DEUN., supra note 20, at 22.
44. Glen, supra note 21, at 439.
45. See Richard A. Ball, The Mythology of Crime in America 13,
source document unknown (mimeographed reproduction).
46. PREsimNT's Co vmMx, supra note 7, at 216.
47. ComMrnTEs, supra note 12, at 7-8.
time as the effectiveness of our intervention under section 601 can
be supported, it seems prudent to follow a course that Edwin Lemert
calls "judicious nonintervention" 48 for, in many cases, official non-
action is as beneficial as official action.49 A study prepared for the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare said it in a different
way.
First, it is not at all clear that doing something is better than do-
ing nothing, or that doing one thing is better than doing another.
... Indeed, we are finally beginning to understand that any in-
tervention has the possibility of harm as well as help, and it is
conceivable that the actions of even the well-meaning helpers do
as much harm as good.50
A corollary to this and possibly a paradox are two studies indi-
cating a positive relationship of police professionalism and the hu-
manistic approaches of judges to severity of restrictions and sanc-
tions.51 These studies suggest that the more professional the police
department, the higher are its arrests for juveniles; and for judges,
the severity of sanctions was related to the degree that they used a
social welfare ideology in their decisions.
The problems of growing up should not be legally defined as de-
linquency, nor should they even be permitted to constitute cause for
invoking the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.52 In fact, if one is
really concerned about rehabilitation and feels that the child needs
the benefit of the juvenile court, a petition can be filed under sec-
tion 600 in the W&I Code. Although precedent has oriented section
600 toward younger minors who are mistreated or abused, and sec-
48. Juv. DELm., supra note 20, at 96-97.
49. Rector, Statement before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee to In-
vestigate Juvenile Delinquency, 16 CmI & DE=IN. 94 (1970); SrncH-
coMnS, supra note 7, at 178; Rubin, Illusions of Treatment in Sentences and
Civil Commitments, 16 CRIME & DE.aw. 79 (1970). The theme through-
out is that there is a right not to be treated when commitment to an insti-
tution or placement on probation is based on the myth of treatment.
Many times both the person and society would be better off by leaving
him alone.
50. Juv. DE=.I., supra note 20, at 418.
51. Wilson, The Police and the Delinquent in Two Cities, in CONTROLL-
IG DELNQuENTS 9 (S. Wheeler ed. 1968); Wheeler, Bonacich, Cramer
and Zola, Agents of Delinquency Control: A Comparative Analysis, in
CONTROLLnTG DELiQUEN's (S. Wheeler ed. 1968). The interpretations of
why this is so is beyond the scope of this paper, however, one interpre-
tation why this may be true for judges and others with a social welfare
ideology is acknowledged in Sol Rubin's article, Illusions of Treatment in
Sentences and Civil Commitments. He comments, "The greater punitive-
ness of the treatment-oriented people is not an accident of law or an
unfortunate by-product of the struggle for better treatment services. It
is a direct result of their view that institutionalization, if used for treat-
ment, is good." 16 CRIVM AND DELnr. 79, 87 (1970).
52. STmccoMBE, supra note 7, at 170-85.
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tion 601 toward older minors who, through their own actions, have
demonstrated a need for help, such use is the result of established
practice rather than legal restraint.53 This section under AB 412
will read as follows:
600. Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any
of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court which may adjudge such person to be a dependent
child of the court:
(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control
and (1) has no parent or guardian, (2) has no parent or guard-
ian willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care or
control, or (3) has no parent or guardian actually exer-
cising such care or control.
(b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided with the necessities
of life, or who is not provided with a home or suitable place
of abode, or whose home is an unfit place for him by reason
of neglect, cruelty, or depravity of either of his parents, or of
his guardian or other person in whose custody or care he is.
(c) Who is physically dangerous to the public because of a men-
tal or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality.
(d) Who is a habitual truant from school within the meaning of
any law of this state.54
Most minors handled under section 601 could have been proc-
essed under section 600(a) because it could be said that their
parents are either unwilling or unable to control them.55 The
latter seems to be more in line with reality for, as Martin Gold
points out, most parents of delinquent teenagers are not irresponsi-
ble and neglectful, at least not toward delinquency, and are con-
cerned about their children's behavior; just ineffective in controll-
ing it.50 This is what section 600(a) is saying and what many
probation officers believe even though they prefer to deal with
the problem under section 601. To perpetuate the credence that
this section is a "parental fault section" is doing an injustice and
disservice to those the law was designed to help. By using sec-
tion 600 (a) for those minors previously processed under section 601,
it will demonstrate our true concern rather than promote an exer-
cise in euphemism by subjecting them to a negative process of image
53. CoiXmvarE, supra note 12, at 9.
54. AB 412 (amended) supra note 3, at 7. It is the author's feeling
that the truancy provision should also be repealed.
55. This does not mean that all of these kinds of cases should be
processed, only that they could be processed if necessary.
56. A. GOLD, DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR IN AN AMERICAN CITY 119 (1970).
development and a series of "social degradation ceremonies '" 5 7 typi-
cal of any facility designed for control. Perhaps, if the public could
believe that crime and delinquency is not just a "contest between
good and evil," they could begin to deal with these problems in an
arena of openness and understanding rather than control and pun-
ishment.58
This latter position, control and punishment, is fairly well en-
trenched in both our criminal and juvenile procedures. Interven-
tion under the guise of treatment is an illusion which expiates our
guilt through the concept of justice.59 As Conrad points out, society
tolerates treatment because "[t] he prevailing theme of the culture
is still punishment; treatment is allowed to coexist because it fills
in time and eases many management problems."60 Although treat-
ment has been accepted as an essential element in the rehabilitation
process, it is still mired in many areas at the philosophical level
struggling for more ways to innovate and implement its methods.
Keve points out the difficulty of bringing about change is that gen-
erations have lived and died, comfortable in their belief that
crime is a simple evil to be controlled and deterred by simple rules
of punishment. This strongly entrenched heritage, though now re-
pudiated by new knowledge, is still dear to the emotional self,
and so a new generation will not easily do an about-face, to turn
its back on time-honored beliefs and happily embrace a new for-
mula for dealing with its antisocial members." 61
Control, then, as it is expressed through the utilization of juvenile
hall in support of section 601, appears to be more of an attempt to
impose upon minors our own moral judgments and values consid-
ered nugatory by the minors themselves (and others) than on help-
ing them with their problems. We must concentrate on changing
behavior, not punishing it, and that means focusing on the causes
and pressures for the behavior rather than the consequences of the
act itself. Enough has been said in the literature to illustrate that
coercion is unnecessary and contributes little toward ultimate cor-
rection. However, many persons feel that without this threat, pro-
57. Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61
AMER. J. Soc. 420 (1956); Goffman, Characteristics of Total Institutions
in CRIMINAL LAw 429 (Donnelly, Goldstin, & Schwartz, eds. 1962).
58. See also, J. LoFLAND, DEVIANCE ANM IDENTITY 301-07 (1969). Lof-
land points out that control and punishment is necessary for the or-
derly functioning of society, but one must be aware of the paradoxes
that this creates. However, working to transcend these dilemmas is still
the best way to a just and authentic social order.
59. K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 9 (1969).
60. J. CONRAD, CRIME AND ITS CORREcTIoN 285 (1965).
61. P. KE=, THE PROBATION OFFICER INVESTIGATES 5 (1960).
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bation would be ineffective,62 even though probation has been found
only to be "less bad" than incarceration and not an end in itself. 3
And, perhaps, it is because juvenile hall is available that those per-
sons dealing with minors are able to "cop out" to the system, and do
not have to evaluate their own decision-making processes and/or
find other solutions.6 4
The very fact that the President's Crime Commission proposed
and came out so strongly for the establishment ot Youth Service
Bureaus gives substance to the charge that the official machinery
and officialdom of the juvenile court is not appropriate for a minor
except in the most severe case. This is not to say that there are not
youngsters who need to be confined and who are impossible to con-
trol, but surely there are alternatives6 5 to processing many more
than needed so a few can be controlled.6 6 Obviously, elimination
62. But cf. Duxbury, Youth Service Bureaus in California: A Progress
Report 55 (DEP'T or YouTH AuTHoRY 1971). The antithesis to this atti-
tude is the fact that the Youth Service Bureau in San Diego County
has found that 59 out of 70 youths returned to the YSB for a second or
subsequent visit even though no sanctions or threat of sanctions were im-
posed. This trend is encouraging and consistent with the idea of the YSB.
63. Downs, Wanted: A Balanced System of Justice, 15 CRIMVE & DE-
LIN. 200 (1969); See Scarpitti and Stephenson, A Study of Probation Ef-
fectiveness, J. CRnm. L.C. & P.S. 361-69 (1968); Garabedian & Gibbons
comment that the high success rate for the boys in this study probably
can be attributed to their being self-correctors and not that probation per
se is responsible for their possible adjustment. BECOMING DELIN., supra
note 16, at 182.
64. So important is this decision-making area that the California De-
partment of Corrections' Research Division has reoriented their activities
and emphasis for the next several years from the offender to decision-
making practices. In their 1970 Annual Research Review, the following
statement is made at 15:
The department has accumulated a large number of studies over a
period of many years documenting the ineffectiveness in reducing
recidivism of programs designed to change the behavior of the of-
fender. We have more recently accumulated a smaller body of
evidence which clearly indicates that rates of return to prison
can be reduced significantly by studying and altering decision-
making practices.... Our focus is, then, upon correctional op-
eratives and decision-makers rather than upon offenders....
Cohn, Contemporary Correctional Practice: Science or Art, 34 FEDERAL
PROBATION 21 (1970); See also Sumner, supra note 30, at 175.
65. But cf. Position of the Los Angeles County Probation Dept., Re-
moval of § 601 from the WELF. AND INST'N CODE 7-10 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as L. A. COUNTY]. Although they oppose elimination of § 601 at this
time, some of their alternatives and recommendations regarding 601 cases
are excellent.
66. Sheridan, supra note 32, at 28.
of section 601 does not mean all juvenile problems will be elimi-
nated as well, but removal of this section would free the system
for more urgent matters and help speed the development of more
humane and judicial alternatives to many of these problems. 7
The Committee felt that the use of fear and coercion (control and
punishment) as a substitute for inadequate resources or rehabilita-
tive capability was self-defeating. 68 It was not felt that those in
charge would examine their own effectiveness as long as the ability
to incarcerate minors was still available.0 9 The lack of attention
given to alternatives will continue, for as long as section 601 re-
mains, neither the community nor the court needs to look respon-
sibly for solutions. Judge Bazelon, Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, recently stated
The situation is truly ironic. The argument for retaining beyond
control and truancy jurisdiction is that juvenile courts have to
act in such cases because 'if we don't act, no one else will.' I sub-
mit that precisely the opposite is the case: because you do act,
no one else does. Schools and public agencies refer their prob-
lem cases to you because you have jurisdiction, because you exer-
cise it, and because you hold out promises that you can provide
solutions.70
The situation was dramatized by one author who criticized the
American people for being content to regard juvenile courts as sani-
tation departments whose job it is to keep the community clean by
picking the undesirable kids off the streets. "No one pays too close
attention to how a sanitation department does its job as long as it
does it reasonably well. But when the storage bins overflow and
the waste disposal system clogs, people begin to notice. Initially, it
occurs to us that maybe we ought to build bigger bins, install up-to-
date equipment. But when the jammings and the breakdowns per-
sist, it is time to take a long, hard look at the system itself. 71
A good hard look was taken by the President's Crime Commission
67. For alternatives see L. A. COUNTY, supra note 65; Lerman, supra
note 34, at 39-44; E. LEmERT, INSTEAD OF COURT-DIVERSION IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE, Public Health Service Publication No. 2127 (1971); GOLD &
W NTER, A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAMS FOR PRE-
VENTING DELINQUENCY (1961); MORSE & HAWKINS, supra note 18, at
156-72; CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 38-44; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra
note 7, at 220-38; L. EMPEY, ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE (1967); U.S. CHILDREN'S BUR., STANDARDS
FOR JUV. AND FAMILY COURTS (USCB Pub. No. 437-1966); RUBIN & SMITH,
THE FUTURE OF Tim JUVENILE COURT, Joint Commission on Correctional
Manpower & Training (1968).
68. COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 10.
69. Id. at 10-11.
70. Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 JUV. CT. JUDGES
J. 44 (1970).
71. RicHETIE, supra note 14, at 6.
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
and they offered as one of their solutions a continuation of the
movement towards narrowing the juvenile court's jurisdiction, and
at the very least, consideration given to "complete elimination of
the court's power over children for noncriminal conduct."72 Others
have followed this lead including the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency.7 3 In California, a Special Committee on Judicial
Reform, Los Angeles Superior Court, recommended that section 601
W&I Code be eliminated. In their report of February 22, 1971, they
state:
Section 601 in effect permits irresponsible parents, overworked or
ineffective school personnel and agencies unable to effectively col-
lect evidence to establish parental neglect, to "put a record" on a
youngster who, in most cases, is not the one primarily responsible
for the activity involved. It is a section ofttimes used against
dependent and neglected children who are difficult to handle in
company with other dependent and neglected children. It is also
used as a "dealing" section to encourage a plea where a delin-
quency conviction could not be sustained. The experience of juve-
nile court judges has been that the intrusion of the court often ac-
centuates and perpetuates the family schism that is characteristic
of the 601 case.
7 4
There is concern that the current "non-system" of criminal justice
is on the verge of collapse if continued crime and delinquency go
unabated without any change in its administration. 75 And our
72. PREsiDF-T's Comm'N, supra note 7, at 228.
73. On October 28, 1970, the Board of Trustees, National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, came out with a policy statement recommending
in part that "Laws creating 'crimes without victims' should be removed
from the criminal codes .... The commonest examples of such so-called
laws are ... and, among children, truancy and running away from
home-acts which, if committed by an adult, would not be considered
crimes." 17 CRIME & DELiN. 129 (1971).
74. Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL RE-
roims, A Study of Current Problems Affecting the Administration of Jus-
tice, at 26-27, February 22, 1971, regarding the use of § 601 as a dealing
section. Approximately 70% of the 602 cases referred to probation depart-
ments throughout California and in Los Angeles County were initially
filed under § 602 but were reduced to a 601 petition in the interest of
justice or to avoid an adversary proceeding. But see, L.A. County, supra
note 65, at 3. In view of the decision rendered in In re Daniel R., 274 Cal.
App. 2d 749, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247, one wonders how many of these petitions
could have been sustained under a 602 petition and/or whether this prac-
tice is judicially sound. Also the practice of using § 601 as a "catch all"
section for unprovable offenses is contrary to the intent of the law. Cf.
Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1107-10 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
75. R. Carter, A. McEachern, H. Sigurdson, Planning for Criminal and
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failure in attacking the priorities to ameliorate the situation is in-
excusable when the delay appears to be for the convenience of those
administering the system and at the expense of the minor.1 0
Former Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, John W. Gardner, said:
... an important thing to understand about any institution or so-
cial system, whether it is a nation or a city, a corporation or a fed-
eral agency: it doesn't move unless you give it a solid push.
Not a mild push-a solid jolt. If the push is not administered by
vigorous and purposeful leaders, it will be administered eventu-
ally by an aroused citizenry or by a crisis. 7
Although some see the crisis as already here, the "push" needs more
momentum in exerting the pressures that will become the agents of
change.
This line of thinking is not well received by many persons in
the field of corrections or probation and seems to enlarge the hiatus
between the "policy rulers" and the "apostles of change". The ad-
vocates of change appear to need a special aegis to protect them
from the organizational strategies that are united for the perpetua-
tion of the status quo. A juxtapositon of attitude is needed between
the two in order to give a sense of balance and equilibrium to a sys-
tem marked by misrepresentation of facts and viewed with public
indifference and confusion.
Unless the public is correctly informed of the shortcomings of the
criminal justice system, they cannot be expected to respond to
needed changes or provide the resources necessary to deal with
these juveniles in a more humane and just manner. Legislation
such as AB 412 will prevent a game of verbal charades by demand-
ing a commitment from all to engage in a cooperative effort towards
operationalizing meaningful alternatives for those young people
previously adjudicated by the juvenile court. There will be too
much to do and no time for the profusion of rhetoric so common
today.
Therefore, the deletion of section 601 from the W&I Code is rec-
ommended, not only for its beneficial elimination of appropriate
Juvenile Justice at 12 (1970) (unpublished paper in USC, Public Systems
Research Institute).
76. Lerman, siipra note 34, at 42; See A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
1970; W. CHAMBLrss, CRnM AMW HE LEGAL PROCESS 84-98 (1969); See
Furstenberg, Political Intrusion and Government Confusion: The Case of
the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 6 THE
Am. SOCIOLOGIST 59 (1971); see also, Mangel, How to Make a Criminal
Out of a Child, LooK, June 29, 1971 at 53.
77. Craft, The Dilemma of the Forest Service, 76 AMERICAN FoREsT 55
(June 1970).
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statistics, but as a means of effecting change within the criminal
justice system on the basis of today's knowledge and understanding.
Lest we forget, we are closer to the year 2000 than 1899, and socie-
ties' institutions and laws must adapt to the changing world about
them rather than remain immobilized by the mythology of tradition.
